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Abstract. Security constraints that enforce security requirements characterize 
healthcare systems. These constraints have a substantial impact on the resiliency 
of the final system. Security requirements modelling approaches allow the 
prevention of cyber incidents; however, the focus to date has been on prevention 
rather than resiliency. Resiliency extends into the detection, mitigation and 
recovery after security violations. In this paper, we propose an enhanced at a 
conceptual level that attempts to align cybersecurity with resiliency. It does so by 
extending the Secure Tropos cybersecurity modelling language to include 
resiliency. The proposed conceptual model examines resiliency from three 
viewpoints, namely the security requirements, the healthcare context and its 
implementational capability. We present an overview of our conceptual model of 
a cyber resiliency language and discuss a case study to attest the healthcare 
context in our approach. 
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1 Introduction 
Security covers an increasingly broad range of domains that rarely interplay in other 
contexts. For example, a healthcare system's security design should address, not just 
hardware and software vulnerabilities, but also other issues, such as equipment failures, 
human errors, dependencies of healthcare services. In this sense, it essential to provide 
a common language to address and manage this heterogeneity within the security 
context. Such a language will allow the specification of a broad range of security 
requirements of different stakeholders within the healthcare setting. Moreover, it can 
allow the analysis of their resiliency as part of their security requirements elicitation, 
meaning as early as possible in their design. 
Healthcare systems stand for the organization of interacting elements arranged to 
accomplish one or more healthcare purposes (based on [1]). Examples of healthcare 
systems are implantable cardiac medical devices; medical ventilator and robotic X-ray. 
Long life-cycles characterize healthcare systems. Over the usable lifespan of 
healthcare, their design and development methods change [47]. While an understanding 
of the preventive security aspects of healthcare systems' design is essential, issues 
associated with other requirements and constraints when incidents occur are of more 
significant concern for life-critical and context-aware systems. Healthcare systems are 
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increasingly networked, interconnected and software-dependent. With limited 
resources and an ever-evolving threat landscape, any new insight into the cyber 
resiliency of healthcare systems and their design and implementation becomes crucial 
[22].  
Cyber resiliency (also termed resilience) stands according to NIST SP 800-160, V.2. 
for "the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions, 
stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber 
resources." [40]. Based on the context (e.g., supply chain, environmental, 
psychological, technological) with which it associates, resiliency can approach 
different types of problems. In this paper, we focus only on cybersecurity resiliency, 
excluding other contexts of resiliency. 
One approach to allow the by-design cyber resiliency of maintaining security 
requirements is the Model-driven engineering (MDE) [10, 47]. For healthcare systems 
that have the patient-in-the-loop, model-based frameworks that explicitly model an 
MCPS's interaction with the environment and with the patient can contribute towards 
safer development [5]. Similarly, modelled-based security approaches have shown the 
benefits of considering security requirements from the early stages of systems 
development [34, 32]. Such modelling approaches can potentially facilitate the 
development of healthcare systems that consider the full cyber resiliency life-cycle (i.e., 
preparation, identification, containment, eradication, recovery, lessons learned) [13]. 
Many security requirements modelling approaches are based on Goal-oriented 
Requirements Engineering (GORE). Typically, they analyze a system considering its 
organizational, operational and technical environment; to identify issues and 
opportunities. High-level goals are then modelled refined to address such issues and 
meet the opportunities [20, 15]. In Security Requirements Engineering (SRE), relevant 
requirements are then elaborated to meet those goals [32, 2, 34]. MDE and SRE may 
be used in combination to support the resilience of healthcare systems and in particular, 
to improve the awareness of redesign and reconfiguration capabilities of a healthcare 
system, before its actual construction. After all, any of such activities, if not well studied 
in advance, can harm the patients. Such cases contradict with the fundamental medical 
goal of "at least not harm" [5], and hence, they should not be ignored in healthcare 
systems engineering. 
The main aim of this paper is to explore the consideration of cyber resiliency under 
conditions of uncertainty where incidents challenge the achievement of a healthcare 
system's goals. In this paper, we present the first step towards the modelling language, 
which will be part of a framework: redesigning a metamodel. Notice that we do not 
offer a modelling language, but we do present underlying conceptual considerations 
that led to the redesign of the language. 
The research outcomes presented here aim to enhance the resilience management of 
cybersecurity by proposing a cybersecurity-resilience unified model. Mainly, the 
contribution of this paper comprises of: 
─ a combination of resiliency in the cybersecurity domain, extending the Secure 
Tropos approach to cover resiliency concepts. We focus on the design of systems 
considering cyber resiliency from the stage of requirements engineering; 
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─ the proposed conceptual model presented as a UML class diagram, useful for the 
development of other cybersecurity artefacts that support cyber resiliency. Such 
artefacts can include processes, algorithms and tools. Such artefacts can support the 
semi-automation of a cyber resiliency analysis; 
─ the demonstration of the pertinence of the conceptual model in regard to the 
healthcare context, through a case study. 
2 Background 
Existing research indicates areas where more domain-specific research is needed. It is 
possible to form a structured approach for cyber resiliency with the current technical 
means. But validation and evaluation approaches for the assessment of resiliency plans 
and their resilience capability is limited [44][14][16][18][12]. Restrictions in the form 
of time, security capabilities, actors’ skills, responder’s motivation, financial resources 
and heterogeneity among systems are also addressed [14][45][11][21][18][30] showing 
the need for a holistic approach. The technological heterogeneity that introduces 
complexity associated with the healthcare context yields a technical conflict [7][23]. 
Specifically, security mechanisms exist for security [44], but research related to their 
cyber resiliency, let alone in regard to healthcare systems is very limited [23]. This is 
coupled with the challenges of incident quantification [17] and cyber resiliency 
assessment [14], enforcement of resiliency plans and security practices during response 
[44][18]. Additionally, the lack of cybersecurity expertise results in outsourced 
resilience that does not correspond to healthcare contextual needs [14][21]. Hence more 
research is required in the field where cybersecurity, resiliency and healthcare intersect.  
 
2.1 Healthcare cyber resiliency 
Concerning healthcare and cyber resiliency, Jalali et al. conducted a systematic review 
of journal articles that focus on cyber resiliency in healthcare [23]. They identified the 
need to evaluate and improve incident response strategies. The existing literature, in 
regard to the different phases of resiliency offers some guidance. For example, for 
preparation phase of cyber resiliency in healthcare, the literature addresses the need for 
more resources referring not only to financial but also to other types such as human 
availability and systems’ redundancies [44][14][16]. It also identifies the need for 
security policies [44][16][12], identification capability of critical information, systems, 
actors and the dependencies among them [44][45][43].  
The literature related to the cyber resiliency phase of detection and analysis, shows 
that independently from preparedness and preventive security mechanisms, incidents 
can still occur. When that happens a root cause analysis (RCA)is suggested [14][11] to 
guide incident categorization [16][17][21]. When an incident does occur, existing 
works are concerned with the need of healthcare organizations to maintain 
communication with internal and external parties, which will be also used for 
compliance with legally required notifications [14][16][17][18][23]. Forensic analysis 
is essential at all phases and at this phase it supports incident classification, 
prioritization and damage assessment of the affected entities [16][23][12]. 
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At the phase of containment, eradication and recovery, according to the literature, 
incident response teams (IRTs) need to contain an incident initially. Containment 
requires the availability of relevant technical and legal expertise [14]. At this phase 
incident, IRTs want to eliminate any further damage [16]. They can achieve that 
through a diverse set of control mechanisms to initially neutralize an attack, using 
incident response systems, segmentation of networks, disconnection of affected devices 
and algorithmic recovery support to name a few [11][23]. These are all relevant with 
downtime procedures, vulnerabilities patching and forensic evidence preservation 
[16][23]. 
For the implementation of these controls and activities, what seems to be essential is 
the way with which IRTs prioritize restoration activities [17]. This prioritization seems 
in case studies to be a straight forward ability, and current ad hoc practices seem to 
indicate that [14]. However, within healthcare organizations, there are various people, 
processes and technologies that are prioritized differently under different circumstances 
[14][16]. Thus an ad hoc mentality is not optimal as attacks are sophisticated, and they 
can introduce delays and further vulnerabilities that can allow more attacks, more 
significant impact or increased costs [14][11]. 
Lastly, at the phase of post-incident activity that follows the demobilization of the 
emergency operations command center, healthcare organizations need to take actions 
to prevent an incident’s recurrence [17][43]. Regulatory oversight might be necessary 
in cases of health sector-wide digital changes, following an incident [18]. To list and 
initiate the necessary changes as well as to determine how wide they need to be, the 
identification of what went wrong is necessary. After debriefing takes place based on 
reports of incident occurrence and severity resulted from the previous phases, 
assessments are conducted [44][14]. 
After this knowledge has been collected, it needs to be redistributed back to the 
healthcare organization [21][23]. Essential part of this process is the documentation of 
the recommendations and lessons learned that commonly take the form of a after action 
report (AAR) [14][16][17][23]. 
2.2 Security-oriented modelling languages 
There are plenty of existing security-oriented modelling languages. Each one of the 
addresses relevant concerns from a different viewpoint. Usually, they extend existing 
modelling languages to cover security concerns. For example, Misuse Cases [42] and 
Abuse Cases [29], extend the use case diagrams, to elicit threats and vulnerabilities that 
adversaries could target. SecureUML [28] also extends UML diagrams centering on 
authorization constraints for access control goals. UMLsec [24] is another approach 
that extends UML, providing security data to UML diagrams. SecureUML and 
UMLsec address security at the design level and they do not concentrate on assets and 
early security requirements. 
Other examples are extensions of the i* goal-oriented approach [46], an extension 
of Tropos [19]. KAOS, which is also goal-oriented, addresses security concerns by 
perceiving attacks as anti-goals [26]. Anti-goals stand for adversarial purposes that 
obstruct security goals. Abuse Frames have also been used to frame a security 
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problem’s scope with anti-requirements and their usage to aid the formation of security 
requirements and the examination of relevant vulnerabilities and threats [27]. 
The Secure Tropos [34] approach is also an extended Tropos [9] version, which 
provides means to elicit and analyze security requirements. It allows the expression of 
a wide range of security, privacy and trust requirements in the form of constraints. 
Secure Tropos is well-known for being a robust language for defining secure systems 
at the organizational level. Its organizational approach to security allows its extension 
to cover the healthcare context considering attacks that can have beyond cyber also 
physical impact. Furthermore, existing automatic tools (i.e., SecTro [36]) ease the 
design activities using this metamodel and can also be extended accordingly. 
3 Redesign decisions and challenges 
The Secure Tropos metamodel inspired the first design attempt of a cyber resiliency 
modelling language for healthcare [34]. The initial design of the metamodel can be 
found in [6]. The decision of a redesign stemmed from interviews with experts from 
the Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals and MedStar Health as well as the 
application of small case studies. From there, it became apparent that the metamodel 
needed some enhancements. As a group, we agreed into three main redesign 
enhancements: the incident, the healthcare context and the inclusion of constructs 
related to resiliency. These enchantments led to the design of a second version of the 
metamodel, presented in Fig. 1. The following subsections report on how this 
metamodel was redesigned. 
3.1 Justification for the use of Secure Tropos 
We consider that the Secure Tropos metamodel is suitable to achieve the following 
purposes that relate to our research: 
1. Supports the analysis and design activities in the software development process, 
capturing early and late requirements, modelling the environment of the system and 
the system itself respectively. Hence it can be used for healthcare systems 
representing the unique environment in which they operate. 
2. It takes into account the relationship between security controls and security 
requirements [38]. This aspect forms an important base for the assessment of a 
security design when controls fail to achieve security requirements (i.e., when 
successful attacks do occur). 
3. It is based on the principle that security should be taken into consideration from the 
early stages of the software system development process instead of been added as an 
afterthought. Resiliency also needs to be considered from early development stages, 
and a relevant conceptual extension might be useful. 
4. Provides a modelling language, a process and a set of reasoning automation to 
support security analysis. The overall approach is well known and peer-reviewed, 
and any extension does not need to establish fundamental constructs but focus only 
to those constructs that are related to cyber resiliency and are not currently covered.  
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Fig. 1. Redesigned metamodel. 
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5. Secure Tropos, has been already extended to cover different types of systems (e.g., 
cloud security requirements [33], trust [37], business processes [4]). Following this 
paradigm, an extension can take place addressing the unique characteristics of 
healthcare systems in relation to their cyber resiliency. 
Having identified some of the advantages of extending Secure Tropos, coincide with 
other security requirements approaches (e.g., KAOS [25], CORAS [8], SQUARE [31], 
GBRAM [3]). However, these approaches tend to focus on the preventive aspect of 
security. Resiliency stands for the ability to prepare for, respond to and recover from 
cyber incidents. It helps a healthcare infrastructure to prepare for incidents, defend 
against, limit their severity and ensure the continuation of operations despite an 
incident. Cyber resiliency has emerged as traditional cybersecurity measures are 
challenged, especially in the case of APTs [35]. When incidents do occur, the systems 
need to be able to keep up with the changes and continue to pursue critical goals and 
functions. 
3.2 Redesign challenges 
The redesign of the modelling language with resiliency in the healthcare context is a 
challenging and critical task. Typically, cybersecurity languages are well structured and 
technical. Requirements engineers and technology-oriented stakeholders use the same 
vocabulary having a technological focus. They can follow deterministic approaches 
using security models as the technological interdependencies are known. However, the 
healthcare context introduces unique challenges for a language redesign. Such a 
redesign requires a way to capture the healthcare aspect to be able to express relevant 
processes and services. However, this is not enough. It also needs to show how 
cybersecurity and resiliency affect and are affected by it too. There classical 
deterministic approaches do not suffice. Because on the one hand, incidents cannot be 
easily analyzed and managed, nor cyber resiliency engineering is yet well studied and 
understood to be able to determine with certainty responses and their negative impact 
on infrastructure’s operational or security capability. 
Semantic level differences intensify these difficulties as the language has a 
multidisciplinary focus. Different interpretations of the same term or different terms 
with the same meaning are common, which the literature review indicates. 
Nevertheless, the language needs to ensure that all the involved stakeholders share and 
understand the terminology used. However, this terminology expands far beyond the 
technology constructs commonly applied for the conceptualization of cybersecurity and 
resiliency. Social aspects integrated into the healthcare context demand from a language 
to also consider the values that underpin a diverse set of stakeholders that holds them 
might prioritize and appreciate them differently. For example, healthcare stakeholders 
commonly focus on systems functionalities that enhance the health and wellbeing of 
patients and do not cause harm. Naturally, they prioritize safety over security and 
understand the necessity for cyber resiliency differently from security and resiliency 
engineers. For example, they prioritize availability over maintenance and practice with 
medical equipment over participation in the incident response capability testing of their 
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department. To redesign a language that combines cybersecurity features with 
resiliency, we realized that there was a need to form constructs that support their 
unification. Though, there was no clear way derived from the literature to support us 
into making such a decision. Consequently, to face this obstruction, we plan to involve 
practitioners for validation of the redesigned language. 
3.3 Healthcare cyber resiliency challenges 
Healthcare services are dependent not only to computer systems and hospital equipment 
but also to devices attached to or even implemented in the human body. Thus, the 
healthcare context introduces unique challenges in the design of a language. For 
cybersecurity and resiliency, this means that any configuration can have not only cyber 
impact but also kinetic. This context sets implementational barriers of conventional 
cybersecurity approaches. For example, the time and duration of security and resiliency 
are affected. They need to consider what healthcare processes are ongoing when an 
incident occurs and how they can pursue security requirements attainment even when 
an attack has successfully compromised other healthcare systems of the same 
infrastructure (e.g., hospital, biomaterials facility).  
Moreover, healthcare systems are diverse and have different challenges and 
limitations based on their type. For instance, the security challenges for a healthcare 
system where the user has device control capabilities, raise cybersecurity challenges 
related to the design of an interface that recognizes cases of patient’s misuse [39]. 
However, in healthcare systems that sense and actuate without user involvement, the 
challenges are different and not user-related. They relate to the systems decision 
process design, the establishment of secure communications among system’s 
components given hardware limitations, and even the alert system that will inform that 
security configurations are undertaken and can change the system’s behavior and are 
within the patient’s body [39]. It becomes clear through these simple examples that 
healthcare challenges cannot be excluded from the cyber resilience design because that 
can cause much more than just systems malfunctions. The patient is in the loop of this 
system, along with all the other users of such devices and ultimately the society as a 
whole. Please note that the first paragraph of a section or subsection is not indented. 
The first paragraphs that follows a table, figure, equation etc. does not have an indent, 
either. 
3.4 Conceptual metamodel redesign 
The basic idea of redesigning a metamodel is that the initial metamodel is the source 
that produces the redesigned metamodel. Before presenting an overview of the 
redesigned model, let us clarify that we have a model engineering perspective. In other 
words, we want to elaborate redesign decisions with the help of metamodels. Model 
engineering suggests that we have to start by identifying an existing metamodel for a 
redesign. Such a metamodel abstracts and collects the changes. In our redesign, we use 
the UML class diagram for the formulation of redesign models. Consequently, the 
redesigned model is a UML model. The class diagram in Fig. 2 presents the three parts 
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of the redesigned model. Incident constructs are in the middle, healthcare constructs in 
the left, and resiliency constructs in the right. The model also expresses generalization 
and associations among the various constructs. 
 
Fig. 2. Early version of the redesigned metamodel of Secure Tropos. 
The main semantic changes reflected in the three parts of the redesigned model resulted 
from a systematic review of the scientific and standardization literature. The purpose 
of the review was the sound derivation of a conceptual model. Here we cannot present 
in detail the review process, but we discuss the main findings that resulted in the 
redesign of the modelling language at a conceptual level. Every construct has a variety 
of functions and implications, which can change over time and context. The conceptual 
unification of cybersecurity and resiliency starts with the identification of the basic 
constructs of the problem to be treated. The common terms identified in the relevant 
literature are incident, healthcare, response and security. We briefly present how they 
have been interpreted, offering useful components for the design of a conceptual model 
of a modelling language. 
The set of collected papers interprets the term incident in four different ways. The 
majority of papers (7) consider an event such as updates, hardware failures, 
emergencies, human errors, natural disasters, misuse and abuse cases as occurrences of 
incidents [44][14][45][17][21][30][12]. In 4 papers an incident interpreted as a 
cybersecurity attack like hacking, ransomware and advanced persistent threat (APT) 
[11][43][7][12]. Two (2) papers use the NIST SP 8000-61 definition either explicitly 
or implicitly [16][23] and 1 paper focuses on the effects of an occurrence on systems 
functions and society as an incident [18]. Here it seems that an incident definition exists, 
and each study chooses to focus on an aspect of an incident. Other studies seem to 
choose a wider scope, that of event that also includes incidents and subsequently 
cybersecurity incidents. 
Healthcare overall appeared to have five different meanings. In 3 papers coincides 
with the term hospital [44][16][17], in 6 papers with a form of a system, including 
medical cyber-physical systems, electronic medical records systems and healthcare 
information systems [14][45][11][43][7][30], in 3 papers as a healthcare critical 
infrastructure or a particular type (e.g. NHS) [45][7][18], in 2 papers addressed 
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healthcare organizations in general [21][23] and 1 was focusing on healthcare 
information [12]. From the above, it can be observed that the majority of papers 
interpret the term healthcare as a type of healthcare system. It is important here to 
clarify, that the reason the number of papers corresponding to meanings (15) is greater 
than the set of papers collected (13) is that in some papers the same term is used but is 
given multiple meanings. The same holds for the rest of the terms and the corresponding 
number of papers with similar interpretations. 
When it comes to response, 4 papers address specific aspects/phases like detection, 
forensics and post-incident activities [7][21][30][12], 3 papers refer to all the phases of 
incident response [14][16][43], 2 papers analyze response overarching manner ranging 
from reactive on the one end and on the other to proactive adaptable responses to 
incident characteristics [44][11], in 2 papers response is studied within the planning 
context in the form of an incident response plan (IRP) along with other types of plans 
like emergency plan and business continuity plan [17][23]. Response is also considered 
closely associated with resilience and recovery in [45] and with management in [18]. 
The selected set of papers studies response from many aspects, usually related either 
with its phases individually or as a whole and in other studies as broader positioning of 
response within healthcare organizations. 
The concept of security is one that is commonly associated with safety. Within this 
set of papers that was the case only in [16] and even there, the proposed security 
approach adjusts to feet cybersecurity needs. Examining relevant papers, it also seems 
that security mostly in the past but also in the present focuses on information security 
and confidentiality, integrity and availability properties [44][45][16][21][30][12]. 
However, in more recent studies, cyber-physical aspects are studied as well as moving 
from information technology-security to what is referred to in the broader literature as 
operational technology-security [7][18]. 
Specific aspects of security are also studies in the relevant literature. The 
conceptualization of security as vulnerable [45], the adaptability of security [45][11] 
are two such examples. Moreover, security is addressed from a socio-technical 
perspective [43], as organization wide [14][17]. In some cases, defense [44] and 
forensics [12] as important elements of security are studied based on risk plans [23]. 
Thus, security evolves as cyber risks do. The cyber risks become more sophisticated 
and dynamic, and security interpretations and understanding reflect these changes. 
3.5 Incident redesign 
While most people have an intuitive idea of what an incident is when asked to define it 
explicitly, there are large numbers of correct answers. From early incident response 
research, we learn that incidents have typically been defined as including the concepts 
of a set of security constraints imposed to goals within an infrastructure, that are 
impacted from actual attacks or are exposed to potential threats. An incident has been 
defined from NIST SP.800-61r2 as "a violation or imminent threat of violation of 
computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices." 
[13]. Based on the above definitions and our interviews with experts an incident stands 
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for a negative occurrence that happens or is thought of as happening and leads to the 
failure of security constraints maintenance. 
This definition similar to NIST SP.800-61r2 is quite subtle because it not only allows 
that an incident can be something that actually happened in the real world, but also that 
it can be imaginary and does not really occur. The example of a false positive alarm of 
an intrusion detection system can be treated as an incident even though it did not occur. 
The second meaning describes incidents that occur in computer systems. In this way, 
the term incident corresponds to incidents as a threat or as an actual attack. 
An incident can be better understood through its likelihood and severity. In our 
framework, we consider likelihood as evidence that maintains or rejects the occurrence 
of an incident (MAIN and REJ). For example, the resilience entity all the actions the 
surgeon takes should be recorded with nonrepudiation capability in the telesurgery 
robotic system will help to enforce (MAIN) the security constraint protect against any 
reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of patient’s health-care data and discard 
(REJ) the incident modify messages while packets are in-flight. 
On the other hand, severity is introduced as the influence of an incident to a security 
constraint. This relation allows us to model situations where a single incident impacts 
on more than one security constraints. The occurrence of an incident contributes to 
security constraint maintenance. In other words, a system under normal circumstances 
achieves a security constraint. When an incident occurs, the system wants to maintain 
security constraint achievement. The occurrence of an incident contributes to a security 
constraint’s negatively in regard to its maintenance. Since the severity of an incident 
restrains a security constraint when it occurs, in our model, we use only MAIN relations 
between an incident and security constraints. This relation stands for the maintenance 
of an incident and can result in a positive or negative contribution to a security 
constraint’s maintenance. 
On the other hand, a resilience mechanism is a tool or technique that can be adopted 
in order to either prevent, mitigate or recover from an incident or is meant to implement 
a security constraint. A resilience mechanism might operate by itself, or with others, to 
provide a particular service. When an incident stands for a threat, then the preventive 
aspect of a resilience mechanism is meaningful, whereas in cases where an incident is 
an actual attack, then the mitigating and recovery aspects are relevant. 
A healthcare and safety constraint (HSC) is a safety condition that the system has 
to achieve and restricts a security constraint in order not to endanger a patient's health 
and/or well-being. In the modelling process, HSC constraints are modelled as variation 
points of a resiliency plan. They are imposed by a healthcare actor that restricts the 
achievement of a security constraint. HSC constraints are within the control of an actor. 
This association with actors means that, differently than security constraints, HSC 
constraints are conditions that an actor wishes to introduce to protect the patient in the 
loop that characterizes healthcare systems. However, HSC constraints are examined 
based on how they affect security entities and thus contribute towards the analysis of 
resilience security requirements. HSC constraints can also be grouped according to the 
safety objective towards the achievement they contribute. Safety objectives are broader 
descriptions of safety principles or rules such as sterilization, calibration and 
interoperability. 
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3.6 Healthcare redesign 
Healthcare services are dependent not only to computer systems and hospital equipment 
but also to devices attached to or even implemented in the human body. Thus, the 
healthcare context introduces unique challenges in the design of a language. For 
cybersecurity and resiliency, this means that any configuration can have not only cyber 
impact but also kinetic (e.g., physical harm to a patient). This context sets 
implementational barriers of conventional cybersecurity approaches. For example, the 
time and duration of security and resiliency are affected. They need to consider what 
healthcare processes are ongoing when an incident occurs and how they can pursue 
security requirements attainment even when an attack has successfully compromised 
other healthcare systems of the same infrastructure (e.g., hospital, biomaterials facility).  
Moreover, healthcare systems are diverse and have different challenges and 
limitations based on their type. For instance, the security challenges for a healthcare 
system where the user has device control capabilities, raise cybersecurity challenges 
related to the design of an interface that recognizes cases of patients’ misuse [39]. 
However, in healthcare systems that sense and actuate without user involvement, the 
challenges are different and not user-related. They relate to the systems decision 
process design, the establishment of secure communications among system's 
components given hardware limitations, and even the alert system that will inform that 
security configurations are undertaken and can change the system's behavior and are 
within the patient's body [39]. It becomes clear through these simple examples that 
healthcare challenges cannot be excluded from the cyber resilience design because that 
can cause much more than just systems malfunctions. The patient is in the loop of this 
system, along with all the other users of such devices. text can be associated with 
AND/OR decomposition, contribution and dependency. 
3.7 Resiliency redesign 
Resilience mechanisms are central to the process of determining the impact of an 
incident on the security constraint satisfaction. For instance, the incident ransomware 
attack can obstruct the satisfaction of the security constraint patients' data availability. 
However, the severity of this incident can be reduced with the use of the resilience 
mechanisms use different credentials for backup storage, maintain complete visibility 
of healthcare IT infrastructure and leverage different file systems for backup storage. 
The vulnerability is a critical component that defines the weakness of the designed 
healthcare system or the structure that can be exploited from one or more attack 
methods (e.g., unpatched equipment, insecure communication protocols). Attack 
methods are needed to distinguish between the ways an attacker can utilize to harm the 
system and how this harm is manifested. For example, a social engineering attack 
method manifests as an information breach threat. Each attack method is linked to one 
or more system vulnerabilities.    
Another relevant construct to an incident is the resilience entity that represents any 
resilience-related goal, soft goal, plan, resource, resilience mechanism of the system. 
We extend the meaning of the security entity to cover resilience. For that purpose, we  
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Fig. 3. Example of security model. 
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use the concept as an overarching term to cover especially decomposition, requires and 
endangers relations. 
We understood that detecting simple mishandling incidents is a critical issue. 
However, heading off incidents before they occur requires detecting patterns as they 
are happening. Patterns of resilience can be used to detect situations where resilience is 
likely to result in an unwanted impact. A resilience pattern can be extracted based on 
the pattern definition given from Schumacher [41]. In general terms, a Resilience 
pattern is a template that specifies resilience objects called instances of the pattern. 
According to a security ontology introduced from Schumacher [41] a security pattern 
aggregates the concepts: context, problem and solution. In our modelling language 
following the same pattern ontology, we aggregate under a resilience pattern the 
concepts: health-care context, incident and resilience mechanism as defined in this 
document. The construct incident stands for a specific and observable adversarial action 
that violates or poses an imminent threat of violation of security constraints (based on 
NIST SP.800-61r2 [13]) It is a negative occurrence that happens or is thought of as 
happening. 
The general structure of resilience patterns is identical to traditional patterns. They 
have a descriptive name, a context, a problem and a solution. There are relations to 
other resilience patterns as well. Nevertheless, specific resilience concepts can be 
assigned to these structural pattern elements. An example of such a pattern is 
teleoperation that is subject to hijacking and to be resilient for such attacks it is designed 
with non-persistence (i.e., generating and retaining resources within needs and time 
constraints). 
4 Case study 
We take a scenario where a surgical system performs a surgical procedure (e.g., 
biopsy) on a patient with manipulators and an endoscope. An endoscope is a long, thin, 
flexible tube that has a light source and camera at one end. In our scenario, the surgical 
system comprises a surgical robot, including a station, four robot arms mounted on the 
station and a console for controlling the surgical robot. The surgical system also 
comprises a data server for storing information from diagnostic imaging modalities 
(e.g. MRI, CT, X-ray) which have been captured from a patient with the use of an 
ultrasonic diagnostic device mounted on the distal end of a robot arm and a display unit. 
The display unit simultaneously displays an endoscopic image and acquired from the 
endoscope and an ultrasonic image acquired by the ultrasonic diagnostic device. This 
scenario provides a simplified view of the stakeholders in the surgical system, the 
healthcare services supported, and the concepts involved when a healthcare service is 
provided. 
Due to space limitations in Fig.3 and Fig.4 we present a partial view that captures 
the security and healthcare context, respectively. Particularly Fig.4 depicts the 
healthcare context along with goals, security constraints and resilience entities. The 
process starts taking the security constraints from Secure Tropos and forming a 
conjunctive security constraints tree (where the relation between sub-security 
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constraints represents conjunctive or disjunctive sub-security constraints). We have 
developed a simple security constraints structure with parent goal "perform surgical 
procedure on a patient" that has an AND decomposition (both of them need to be 
achieved for the parent goal to be achieved) with the sub-goals "use console to control 
the surgical robot" and "utilize patient data from the data server". From the high-level 
security constraint "perform a secure surgical procedure on a patient", we can also 
extract leaf security constraints that must be satisfied by resilience entities within the 
system. In our example, we prefer to keep simplicity at this point, because the AND/OR 
decomposition are well known in the existing literature. 
Given ongoing attacks and expected incidents, we derive what security constraints 
are relevant to these incidents and consequently, what are the security entities that we 
need to consider. These considerations take the form of a three-layered incident model 
that connects security constraints, incidents and resilience entities, as shown in Fig.3.  
This model is then used as input for the instantiation of Fig 4. Moreover, by reviewing 
healthcare process documents and relating them with resilience entities, different points 
where a response will need to adjust to the ongoing conditions are specified. In our 
example, some of such points are "ergonomic settings", "laparoscopic procedure" and 
"change device settings". Taking one of these points, let us say "laparoscopic 
procedure" a security practitioner that considers implementing a resilience entity such 
as "encrypt data streams between the surgeon's terminal and the robot" has to consider 
if a laparoscopic operation is taking place at the same time. If so, the overhead or other 
complication that encryption might result from having to be valued in relation to the 
potential impact the response can have to the ongoing healthcare process and 
ultimately, the patient. 
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Fig. 4. Example of healthcare context variations model. 
With this simple case, we were able to demonstrate one of the additional capabilities 
that the enhanced design can offer to cybersecurity practitioners of healthcare 
environments. In particular, we looked at the constructs that relate to the healthcare 
context and described at a high-level process through which such models can be 
instantiated. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper focuses on cyber resiliency in relation to incidents that have recently 
arisen or may arise for healthcare systems. The critical result of this revision of the 
modelling language was the update of the metamodel to define more accurately the 
constructs related to incidents, healthcare and resiliency. These enhancements were 
made to allow security engineers to define a structure to support the resiliency of 
specific applications relevant to their healthcare systems and incident conditions they 
face or prepare to manage. In a case study for a robotic surgical system, we were able 
to demonstrate one aspect of the application of the modelling language extensions. A 
detailed validation needs to take place in future work. Because of the wide variety of 
physical and digital capabilities of healthcare systems along with the potential impact 
they can have, we believe that their cybersecurity needs to be studied further. 
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